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This paper uses data on anticipated bequests from two waves of the Health and Retirement
Study and the Asset and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD), and on actual bequests from
AHEAD.  Actual bequests were measured in exit interviews given by proxy respondents for 774
AHEAD respondents who died between waves 1 and 2.  Because the exit interview is representative
of the elderly population, the distribution of estate values is quite different from that obtained from
estate records, which represent just a wealthy subset of the population.   Anticipated bequests were
measured by the subjective probability of leaving bequests. Between waves 1 and 2, increases in
bequest probabilities were associated with increases in the subjective probability of surviving,
increments in household wealth, and widowing while out-of-pocket medical expenses reduced the
likelihood of a bequest.  By comparing bequest probabilities with baseline wealth we were able to test
a main prediction of the life-cycle model, that individuals will dissave at advanced old-age.  The
AHEAD respondents anticipate substantial dissaving before they die. 
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Important advances have recently been made in documenting the process of wealth
accumulation by households. Because of better data our knowledge is rapidly increasing about
the facts surrounding the distribution of household wealth and to a lesser extent household
savings behavior. However, this improved factual base has not yet been translated into a deeper
understanding about the theoretical reasons why people save. The candidates remain much the
same: life-cycle timing, risk aversion, and bequests, but we appear to be no more certain about
their relative importance. Advances in our understanding of bequest motives has been
particularly difficult in part due to the inherent difficulties in measuring the bequests that
individual anticipate making or the inheritances that they actually bequeath.
This paper will study the role of inheritances and bequests in shaping household decisions
on wealth accumulation. We will learn about bequests by using new methods of measuring
anticipated and actual bequests: We will examine actual bequests made by deceased individuals,
and compare them with their previously stated bequest intentions. Using panel data with two
measurements of subjective bequest probabilities, we will explore the reasons why individuals
might revise their bequest expectations. Among other things, these reasons may include new
information on health or economic conditions of household members. Our results are based on
wealth, anticipated bequests and actual bequests from two waves of the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS), and the Asset and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD)
Because the paper uses two new types of data, considerable space will be allocated to
validation of them. In Section 2 we outline a model of consumption and saving behavior that
will guide our analysis and provide a framework for the validation. Section 3 describes the data
sets that we will use. Section 4 examines the information from exit interviews given by proxy
respondents for 774 AHEAD respondents who died after the baseline AHEAD survey. Among
other things, these exit interviews provide data about the medical and non-medical costs
associated with illnesses of the respondents and the value and distribution of their estates. We
compare average bequests with average wealth in the baseline interview, and we studyhow
bequests covary with observable characteristics. These analyses are consistent with the proxy
reports being valid measures of actual bequests.
In Section 5wediscuss the theoretical and empirical properties of our measure of bequest
expectations. If bequest expectations are valid predictors of actual bequests, they should evolve
in a predictable way in a population over time The actual data conform to the predictions. Based
on predictions from the theoretical model of consumption and saving behavior, we then analyze
panel data on changes at the individual level in the subjective probability of leaving bequests.
According to our results, individuals revise their expectations of bequests appropriately in
response to new information. Having found the data on actual and anticipated bequests tobe
consistent with our expectations and theoretical predictions, in Section 6 we use them to
construct an index of saving intentions. Our results suggest that people plan to dissave before
they die. Section 7 is the conclusion and summary.
Section 2. Model of consumption and saving
Our thinking about how to organize the data will be shaped by the life-cycle model of
1consumption (LCH) as explicated in Yaari (1965) and Hurd (1989) for singles and in Hurd
(1995) for couples. The model has these features and restrictions. The only uncertainty is the
date of death. Resources are bequeathable wealth and a stream of annuity income such as Social
Security, and annuity income cannot be borrowed against. Long-lived individuals may use up
their bequeathable wealth and then live solely from annuity income, which would lead to a corner
solution in the utility maximization. The model allows for a bequest motive for saving.
We outline the model for singles and discuss the implications for bequest behavior. The
model for couples, while substantially more complicated, is in the same spirit, so we will just
give some implications of it.
The single's problem is to maximize in the consumption path {c} expected lifetime utility
fu(ct)ea,dt )em1dt
The first term is expected discounted utility from consumption.
U() the utility flow from consumption;
p the subjective time rate of discount;
a, the probability of being alive at t;
N =themaximum age to which anyone can live (aN =0)
The second term is the expected discounted utility of bequests.
V(S) =utilityfrom bequests which may depend on the economic status of children as in an
altruistic model or in a strategic bequest model;
w bequeathable wealth at t;
=probabilityof dying at t.
The constraints on the maximization are:
w0 is initial bequeathable wealth which is given;
w ￿0V t is the non-negativity constraint.




r =realinterest rate (constant and known)
A =flowof annuities at time t.
The solution is an equation of motion in marginal utility
du
(2)--
= u,(h,+ p— r)—
h,V, for w, > 0
c,=Aforw=O
andw0 given. Here
=marginalutility of consumption at time t
=rn/a1=mortalityrisk (mortality hazard)
V1 =marginalutility of bequests at time t.
2A typical solution as would be found in data is shown in Figure 1. At T, bequeathablewealth has
been consumed, and consumption equals annuity income after T.
Suppose there is no bequest motive, which means that V =0in (2). If p> r,
du dc
> 0 so that < 0 provided u (.)isconcave,
and consumption will always decline with age. If r > p and h, is small aswould be the case at
du
young ages < 0
and consumption will increase with age. At older ages, however, h, is approximately exponential
so that at some age (t in Figure 1),
duand !=Oatt=r
dt
du dc Fort￿'r L>0 and _...i..<O
dt cit
A condition on global utility maximization requires that if consumption declines,wealth must
also decline. Therefore a main implication of the LCH is that bequeathablewealth will decline at
sufficiently advanced old age.
Expected actual bequests will be
fwemdt
where w is the optimal wealth path. Under the assumption that thereis no bequest motive,
such bequests will be accidental, but if individuals are highly risk averse, bequestscould be a
large fraction of bequeathable wealth.
If t> tsothat wealth is declining with age, an increase in life expectancy via an
unexpected decrease in mortality risk at all ages will reduce bequests werethere no behavioral
response to the change in mortality risk:individuals consume more of their bequeathable wealth
before they die. If there is a behavioral response, however, bequests couldincrease: a decline in
mortality risk will flatten the consumption path and reduce initial consumption, causing more
wealth to be held against the increased risk of outliving resources. if wealth increases
substantially, bequests could increase.
Whether bequests increase or decrease depends on the shape of the new optimal wealth
path and the shape of the mortality curve { m, }.Insimulations based on an estimated model for
singles, Hurd (1992) found that in baseline simulations 20.7%of initial bequeathable wealth was
(accidentally) bequeathed; with an increase in life expectancy of aboutthree years, 16.5% was
bequeathed when there was no behavioral response, but 23.0% whenthere was a behavioral
response. The simulations were based on the constantrelative risk aversion (CRRA) in which
Cl-r
u(c)=
1—,witha rather low value of risk aversion (y =1.12)which implies a rather large
3behavioral response to changes in mortality risk. Large values of y will reduce the behavioral
response to a reduction in mortality risk, so that larger values of ? could lead to little change or
even a reduction in bequests.
An increase in the annuity stream also has an ambiguous effect. If individuals are highly
risk averse, consumption will change little in response to the increase. Therefore, wealth will
decline more slowly and, in Figure 1, T will increase and bequeathable wealth will be greater. If
mortality risk is unchanged, bequests will be greater. However, in some circumstances, an
increase in annuities could increase consumption enough that the path of bequeathable declines
relative to be base situation. This is illustrated in Figure 2. It can be shown analytically that this
obtains under the CRRA utility function (Hurd, 1995), and simulations showed that bequests
decreased when annuity income was increased (Hurd, 1993). From the point of view of public
policy it is important to understand whether increases in Social Security benefits are partly
bequeathed back to the younger generation, which would offset some of the increase in taxes
required to fund the increase.
The effect of age on bequest probabilities is unambiguous in a stationary environment. If
the anticipated wealth path from time t onward is declining, leaving a bequest greater than b is
the same as dying before age A *asshown in Figure 3. If an individual survives until time
t + 1 ,hewill have followed the wealth path from ttot+]andhe will still anticipate following
the same wealth path in future periods. Now, however, the probability of surviving to age A *
isgreater because, of course, the conditional probability of surviving to A*increasesfrom tto
t+1. Thus the probability of leaving a bequest greater than b should decline as individuals age.
We have been discussing the situation when there is no bequest motive for saving. A
bequest motive means that Vt >0.At any given level of wealth we would expect V to depend
on the characteristics of the target of the bequest. For example, if the children of an elderly
person are well off, V would be small because the marginal utility of additional wealth to the
children would be small. We would expect that if bequests are altruistic, V, would depend on
the characteristics of all the children of the parent.
A bequest motive flattens the consumption path and reduces initial consumption causing
more wealth to be held. If the probability of dying at any age is unchanged, expected bequests
will increase.
Tests of a bequest motive are of two types. The first is based on a main prediction of the
life-cycle model: in the absence of a bequest motive bequeathable wealth should decline at
sufficiently advanced ages. Such wealth decline has been consistently found in panel data sets
(Hurd, 1995). It should be noted, however, that while a wealth increase is not consistent with a
life-cycle model that excludes a bequest motive, a wealth decline is consistent with a life-cycle
model that includes a bequest motive.
The second type of test is based on variation in the rate of wealth change as a function of
covariates that are assumed to be related to the strength of a bequest motive. Because most
bequests are made to close relatives, it is reasonable to assumed that the number and
characteristics of relatives are related to the strength of a bequest motive. This thinking leads to
a comparison of the rates of wealth change among those with children to those without children.
A consistent finding is that there is little difference, with the implication that any bequest motive
4for saving is weak on average (Hurd, 1987, 1989).
Life-cycle model of consumption by couples
The model for couples is similar to the model for singles: couples have a utility function
defined over consumption while both spouses are alive, and they get utility from contemplating
"bequests." However, there are two types of bequests: wealth to a surviving spouse, and wealth
to a third person at the death of the surviving spouse.' It is important to distinguish between
these two types of "bequests" because a bequest to a surviving spouse increases only slightly the
time horizon for decision making by the couple whereas a bequest to children can lengthen the
planning horizon to many generations. Furthermore, a spouse anticipating widowhood can affect
the prior consumption decisions of the couple, but in most cases children cannot.
Analysis similar to that for singles will show that a bequest motive (desiring to bequeath
to someone outside of the household) will flatten the consumption path and reduce initial
consumption causing more wealth to be held. Thus, expected bequests will increase. Of course,
the effects of changes in life expectancy and changes in the annuity stream are ambiguous as they
are in the case of singles.
The death of a spouse should alter the bequest probabilities of the surviving spouse for a
number of reasons. The date at which the last spouse is expected to die is reduced, and in the
absence of any behavioral reaction bequests should increase. The surviving spouse has high
bequeathable wealth relative to needs: if the couple had contemplated a declining wealth path,
the early death will cause bequests to increase. The annuity stream of the household is typically
altered because both Social Security and pension benefits typically change at the death of a
spouse. The surviving spouse will re-optimize given the new situation causing the path of
bequeathable wealth to differ from what it would have been had the death occurred later. The
total effect on bequests is not obvious, and we will leave it to be determined empirically.
Summary of implications
When there is no bequest motive, at sufficiently advanced old ages individuals will plan
to dissave, and, therefore, the population will dissave provided on average the anticipations of
individuals are realized. With increasing age wealth will decline and expected bequests will
decline. However, an unexpected reduction in survival probabilities causes different effects from
an expected reduction in survival chances that accompanies aging: the unexpected reduction
should cause a behavioral response, which will make its effect on wealth change ambiguous.
Therefore, we should find in panel a reduction in anticipated bequests as the population ages, but
not necessarily a reduction in anticipated bequests as survival chances vary at the individual
level.
In cross-section greater wealth should be associated with higher anticipated bequests even
where there is no bequest motive. In panel there should be no relationship between wealth
change and anticipated bequests as long as the observed wealth change is due to anticipated
'In this model all of the wealth of the couple is transferred to the surviving spouse at the death of
one spouse. It is only at the death of the second spouse that wealth is inherited by children or others.
5dissaving.2 An unanticipated wealth change, however, should change anticipated bequests.
In cross-section variation in annuity income such as pensions and Social Security could
affect anticipated bequests but the sign of the effect depends on utility function parameters.In
panel anticipated changes in annuity income will not changethe wealth path and so they should
not affect anticipated bequests. Unanticipated changes in annuityincome act in the same way as
cross-section variation in annuity income, so the effect on anticipated bequests cannot be signed.
A bequest motive for saving requires only one substantive change to the preceding
summary: wealth can increase with age (but does nothave to) even at advanced old age. The
other analyses of the difference between anticipated and unanticipated changes in survival,
wealth and income remain the same.
We will use two types of panel data to test implications of this model of consumptionand
saving. The first type will be information about actual bequests,and the second will be about
anticipated bequests.
Section 3. Data
Our data come from the Asset and Health Dynamics (AHEAD) study and from the Health
and Retirement Study (HRS). These studies are large panel surveys of individuals. Theyobtain
extensive information about the domains of health, economic status, family relationsand labor
market activity. AHEAD is representative of the population born in 1923 or earlier andtheir
spouses (Soldo, Hurd, Rodgers and Wallace, 1997).At baseline in 1993 it obtained interviews
from 8222 persons who were approximately 70 or over. We will use information from the
baseline interview and from wave 2 which was fielded in 1995. HRS is representative ofthe
population born in the years 1931 through 1941 and their spouses (Justerand Suzman, 1995). At
baseline in 1992 it interviewed 12654 persons. We will use information from waves 2 and 3
which were fielded in 1994 and 1996.
These surveys obtained extensive information about the economic situation of the
households which are interviewed. Of particular importance for this paper are the data on
income and assets. The surveys asked for a complete accounting of income and assets,and they
used bracketing methods to reduce the rate of item nonresponse, resulting in economic data of
high quality. The surveys used innovative questions about subjective probabilitiesto query
individuals about their perceptions of their survival chances and of leaving bequests.
Respondents were asked about their health in a number of ways.Here we use self-reports about
health events such as heart attack, cancer, diabetes, arthritis, stroke, high blood pressure, and
lung disease to find the incidence of these conditions between wavesof AHEAD and HRS.
Section 4. Actual Bequests
Actual bequests are inherently difficult to measure in the population and frequently
2This statement assumes that there is no change in survival chances or that they are
adequately controlled.
3We cannot use wave 1 because the questions about anticipated bequests were not asked
in that wave.
6escape detection in traditional household surveys.Household surveys typically do not include
any post-death interviews with relativeswhich is probably the only feasible way to obtain
information about bequests in the population. Therefore, most applied research on inheritances
has relied instead on estate records (David and Menchik (1985)). While valuable, estate data can
provide only a limited picture. Many inheritances are below the estate taxthresholds and so do
not appear in official estate records. Even when available, estate records provide verylimited
information about the deceased person or about the actual and potentialheirs.4
The AHEAD survey measured bequests by conducting an exit interview following the
death of a respondent. These exit interviews are given to proxies, often relatives of the deceased,
and represent a condensed version of the normal AHEAD interview. In addition, a detailed set of
questions were asked about the nature and costs associated with any illnesses,other death related
expenses, and the distribution and values of estatesand inheritances. Exit interviews are
available for 774 persons who were respondents in wave 1 but who died between wave 1 and
wave 2. In this section, we summarize data from these AHEADexit interviews. Our analysis
focuses on what happened to wealth as measured in wave 1, and how prior wave household
wealth corresponds to the values of estates.
The Cost of illness Associated with Death.
Decedents in the AHEAD age range may leave no bequest because of large expenses
associated with their death. Many of the AHEAD respondents who died between the waves had
frequent and severe illnesses which eventually resulted in death.For example, according to the
exit interviews, 82% of the decedents were hospitalized at least once between their wave 1
interview and the time of their death. Many of these hospitalizations involved multiple visits.
Even if the hospitalization associated with the death of the respondent is excluded, over forty
percent of respondents had three or more hospital visits duringthis time interval. The median
number of nights spent in the hospital was thirteen days, but one in twenty respondents spent 70
days or more in a hospital. The intensity and expense of themedical care provided during these
visits was dramatic. Half of those hospitalized received intensive care and thirty percent were on
life-support.
The total costs of providing such care was substantial. As reported in the exit interviews,
median total costs were about $25 thousand, and one in nine of the deceased had medical
expenses in excess of $100,000. For the purposesof relating wave I wealth to bequests,
however, out-of-pocket costs, not total costs, are relevant. The exit interviewsaimed to measure
all out-of-pocket expenses associated with these illnesses. Out-of-pocket costs were queried
separately for hospital and nursing home visits; hospice; doctor anddental payments; drugs; in
home need care or special facilities or services; and other health care expenses. Ineach case, the
lead in question asks whether the care was fully or partially insured with follow-up questions
4For example, Mulligan (1995) reports that only 5-10% of those who died after the age of
45 file estate tax returns. At the time of the AHEAD survey, the threshold at which estate taxes
start was $600,000 for an individual and as high as $1,200,000 for a married couple.
5AHEAD staff estimate that they were able to conduct exit interviews with over 90% of
respondents who died between the first and second waves.
7about the amount of out-of-pocket costs involved.6
The proxy respondents report that 68% of AHEAD decedents had fully insured hospital
costs and another thirty percent had partially insured costs. Fifty two percentof nursing home
costs were fully insured while another 30% were partially paid for through insurance. Most
doctor visits were also reimbursed (61% totally reimbursed and 38% partially covered) leaving
drugs as the principal personal financial exposure. One-third of theAHEAD decedents had to
pay their full drug costs and another 39% paid atleast part of these expenses. The magnitude of
these out-of-pocket expenses and their implication for the value of estates is discussed in the next
section.
Estates
Table 1 shows the distribution of values of estates as reported by the proxy respondents.
Because the interpretation of what is labeled inheritances depends on whether there remains a
surviving spouse, these distributions are provided separately for married andnon-married
families. One in five of the deceased AHEAD respondents had estates of no value. Mirroring
the distribution of wealth among these households, the distribution of estate values are similarly
quite dispersed and highly skewed. The mean estate value is $94,469,but the median is half as
much, $50,000. Some respondents leave relatively large estates: 30% are $100,000 or more and
7% are in excess of $200,000. Only 3% of the estates were valued at $600,000 or more, which is
the lower limit for estates to be subject to the estate tax. Consequently, estate tax records are
extremely incomplete and they give a very distorted picture of bequests and the attributesof
households who bequeath. For example, the 774 AHEAD deceased respondents left bequests
worth more than 73 million dollars, but only one quarter of that value would appear in estate tax
files.
In addition to estate records, some analyses of bequests rely on information from wills
that pass through probate. While the selectivity of such cases is not as extreme as those which
use estate tax record data, probated wills also represent a selective sample.Just one-third of
AHEAD decedents had probated wills and the average value of those estates was $130.4
thousand; yet those estates which were not probated averaged just $51.9 thousand. Therefore
analyses based on probated wills cannot describe average bequest behavior in the population.
Because the maximum time span between wave 1 and the death of the decedent was two
years the value of the estate should be closely related tohousehold wealth as measured in wave 1.
If it is not, at least on average, we would be skeptical of the validity of the reports on the estate in
the exit interview. Of course, there could be expenditures between wave 1 and the death which
would reduce the correspondence. Figure 4 has a schematic of the leakages that may occur.
Some wealth may be used to pay for medical and other expenses associated with the death; some
to give inter-vivos transfers perhaps to compensate for help received or to escape taxation; some
to finance household consumption of the deceased and other family members; onlythe remainder
is available for the estate.
6Following the normal procedures used in FIRS and AHEAD, if respondents initially did
not provide an exact dollar amount, they were allowed (encouraged) to answer using a sequence
of bracket categories. We used within bracket values for exact amount respondents to impute
values within these bracket.
8Table 2 compares estate values and wave I household wealth of the deceased AHEAD
respondents. On average wave I wealth was $130.2 thousand, and the estates averaged $94.5
thousand. However, in married households, the estate is quite close to non-housing wealth
suggesting that when there is a surviving spouse, the house (presumably jointly owned) is often
not included in the estate. When there is no surviving spouse mean estates values are virtually
identical to prior wave total household wealth. We consider the close correspondence of wave 1
wealth to estate value as good evidence of the validity of the estate reports by the proxy
respondents.
The second part of the table shows costs associated with the death of the AHEAD wave 1
respondent. Although substantial on an absolute scale, these costs are not particularly large
relative to average wave I wealth. For all households, death costs are about 5% of wave 1
household wealth and about 10% of the estate. On average, death expenses by themselves did
not lead to a significant depletion of household wealth; nor can these death expenses account for
much of the difference between wave 1 wealth and estate values
Another source of leakage is that during this time period households may have been
engaging in higher amounts of inter-vivos transfers than usual to avoid estate taxation. The exit
interviews inquired about the extent and amount of such transfers. There is a legitimate question
about the ability of proxy interviews to answer accurately questions about these before-death
transfers. Nonetheless, the fraction of cases in which these transfers occurred was relatively
small. Transfers to children were made in roughly ten percent of all these household with a
median transfer of about $900 (not shown) and few households appear to have given transfers
that were influenced by the tax-exempt limit of $10,000 per recipient. We conclude that while
there is some inter-vivos giving before death for the average household, it is minor relative to the
size of the estate.
Table 2 suggests that estate values as reported by proxy respondents are reasonably
accurate on average. We can informally validate them further by investigating whether estate
values vary in an appropriate way with covariates known to be related to wealth. Because many
households leave no estate at all we estimate the effects of covariates in two stages. The first is a
probit specification for the probability that an estate is positive, and the second is OLS estimation
for the log value of the estate conditional on its being positive.
The results which are in Table 3 are similar to estimates of the determinants of wealth.
Higher education is associated with a greater probability of a positive estate and with a higher
value of the estate. Similarly, income has an important positive impact on the probability of
leaving any estate, and on the value of the estate, although the elasticity is less than unity.
African-American and Hispanic households have lower probabilities of leaving an estate, but do
not appear to differ from white households in the amount of money that is left in an estate. Since
household income is controlled for in both models, any remaining racial and ethnic specific
behavioral differentials associated with bequest leaving behavior appear to rest largely in whether
a bequest is left at all.
Inheritances are smaller in families in which there is a surviving spouse, an indication that
some fraction of family wealth is simply kept by the surviving spouse without passing through
the estate or being labeled an inheritance. In the theory outlined in the previous section, we
suggested that one way of evaluating whether a bequest motive existed was to examine whether
9bequests are related to the existence and number of closerelatives. None of the family structure
variables (the number of living children, grandchildren, or great-grandchildren,the number of
living siblings) has any significant relation to the sizeof the inheritance. This finding is
consistent with what is found in studies based on wealth data: at older ages, changesin wealth
as individuals age are unrelated to the number of children (Hurd;1987, 1989). The only
significant effect is on the probability of having an estate: increasingthe number of children
reduces the probability, which is not a result which would be predicated by a bequestmotive for
saving.
Section 5. Anticipated Bequests
Information about the relative importance of bequests and the reasons for making them
can be obtained either by studying the value of inheritancesreceived by the current generation or
by studying what that generation plans to bequeath. Studying anticipatedbequests has many
advantages since it relates directly to the motives for current savingsdecisions of households.
However, it is difficult to infer bequest intentions from currenthousehold decisions about wealth
accumulation because other savings motives co-exist and actual bequestrealizations may take
place far in the future. Many subsequent events may breakthe link between current intentions
and future reality.
A promising new way of obtaining insight into the existence and strength of bequest
motives relies on the subjective probability of leaving a bequest which wasascertained in I-IRS
waves 2 and 3 and in AHEAD waves 1 and 2. Although thereis some difference in the wording
as between HRS and AHEAD, the substance is illustrated bythe question from AHEAD wave 2.
"Using a number between 0 and 100 what are the chancesthat you (or your
husband/wife/partner) will leave an inheritance of at least $10,000?"
The respondent had previous been instructed to interpret 0 as absolutely nochance and 100 as
absolutely certain. If the answer was 31 or more the question was repeatedbut with a target of
$100,000. In the case of a couple, each spouse was asked these questions independently sothat
within family comparisons can be made.
We will use the subjective probability of leaving a bequest an our measure of anticipated
bequests. In prior work, Smith (1999a) established someof the properties in cross-section of the
subjective probabilities by relating them to wealth and othercharacteristics. As an example of
his findings, Table 4 has the average subjective bequest probabilities inAHEAD wave 1 and
HRS wave 1 for each decile of wealth. The average subjective bequest probabilities are sharply
lower when the target is $100,000 rather than $10,000, and the differences are not proportionate.
For example in the top decile the difference in probabilities is 15 percentage points (AHEAD)
whereas the difference in the fifth decile is 46 percentage points. In the lowest decilethe
probabilities are both essentially zero.
At both target levels and in both surveys the average bequest probability increases
monotonically and sharply with wealth. Although in the very top decilesthere are no large
differences between HRS and AHEAD, the differences are substantial in thelower part of the
distribution. For example the average over the bottom half of the wealth distributionis 29% for
the target of $10,000 in AHEAD but 53% for HRS. For a target of $100,000the averages are 5%
and 17%. This is reasonable because the HRS cohort has more wealth thanthe Al-lEAD cohort
10and many in the HRS cohort are still working and at the ages where their saving rates will be at a
maximum. The implication of this difference between the AHEADandHRS cohorts is that we
can expect bequests to rise over time.
Predictive validity of the subjective bequest probabilities.
Because observations on subjective bequest probabilities have not previously been
available, they have not been subject to scrutiny about their properties and their predictive power.
Therefore, it is reasonable to wonder about their validity. We will say that the subjective bequest
probabilities are valid if they are accurate predictors of the probabilities of actual bequests. Once
the cohort has died, their validity can be evaluated by comparing the subjective bequest
probabilities with actual bequests, but because the AHEAD population is age 70 or over, it will
be many years before such a comparison is possible. However, we can derive a test based on the
estates of the part of the population that died between the waves and on the change in the
subjective bequest probabilities of the part of the population that survived, providing a test that
can be carried out with just two waves of the data.
In panel the subjective probabilities of bequests will change in response to new
information. Some individuals will have unanticipated health changes that will affect their
survival chances; some will have unexpected wealth changes such as capital gains or
losses. These kinds of events should change the subjective bequest probabilities of the affected
individuals. But, to the extent that these events occur at the average ex ante or anticipated rate,
they do not constitute new information in the population and, therefore, should not lead to change
in the average subjective bequest probabilities. At the population level, unanticipated changes
in the survival chances of the population or macro events that systematically lead to windfall
gains or losses will change average subjective bequest probabilities.
If we assume that there are no such macro shocks, we can derive an equation of motion
for the average subjective bequest probability. Suppose that the environment is stationary, so
that individual anticipated wealth paths do not change as each survivor ages. The assumption of
stationarity can be used to derive a test of the validity of the subjective probabilities of bequests.
The test will be based on the relationship between the bequest probabilities at time t, actual
bequests among those that die between tandt+1, and bequest probabilities at time t+ 1.
Let F (B >b)be the probability at time tthatbequests will be greater than b. Then
P,(B >b)=P,(B >b ID1)1(D1)
(3)
where I (D,) is the probability of death at t ,andP (D >t) isthe probability of death at a
time greater than t.
Under stationarity
P(B >bD>t)= > b)
because the anticipated wealth path is unchanging.
In a population of n individuals of age t, let D. =1if the i th person dies at t and
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ootherwise.Then F, (B1 > bD1)F,(Di)is the population average of the first term





whered is the set of individuals who died between t and t + 1. We note that
P1(B>blD1) ={iSe
providedthe time interval between t and t + 1 is short.




where 1(x) =1if x > 0 and 0 otherwise, and s is the set of persons who survived from t
to t + 1. Thus, we can approximately estimate in the panel all of theelements of (4). The
right-hand side is the sum of the fraction of those who died havingbaseline wealth greater than
b weighted by the population mortality rate and of the average probability in wave 2 that
bequests will be greater than b weighted by the populationsurvival rate.
This relationship should hold approximately in the panel. It requires that the anticipated
wealth path be unchanging among survivors, and on the validity of the subjective bequest
probabilities as stated by decedents in wave 1 and on the time consistencyin the statements of
the bequest probabilities by survivors in wave 2. Tn particular it does not require that people
consume according to the life-cycle model.
We can perform a test of the validity of the subjective bequest probabilities based on the
estimated elements of equation (4). Table 5 shows the average wave 1 subjective bequest
probabilities among those who survived to wave 2 and among thosewho died between the
waves. We note that the deceased had lower bequest probabilities reflectingtheir lower wealth
holdings. The overall average is the left-hand side of equation (4).The table shows the right-
hand side of equation (4) as the weighted average of bequest probabilities among survivorsand
the average percent of estates as large as the target. The difference between wave 1 and wave 2
is the difference between the left-hand and right-hand sides of equation (4). For both targets they
are small, and comparisons with the standard errors of the differenceshow that we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the left-hand and right-hand sides of (4) are equal. We interpret this
result as evidence for the validity of the subjective bequest probabilities.
Changes in the Subjective Probabilities of Leaving Bequests
During the two years between waves new information should affectthe subjective
bequest probabilities. Among survivors, an important piece ofinformation is simply that they
survived. As discussed earlier, in steady-state under the assumption of planned dissaving there
12should be a decease with age in the average subjective bequest probability: The survivors will die
at a greater age when wealth is lower. Other types of new information would include health
events that could affect both current expenditures on health care and future expenditures,
unanticipated wealth change such as capital gains from holdings of stocks and bonds, and events
that would change the anticipated consumption path such as a change in the utility from a
bequest due to a change in the economic status of children.
Table 6 shows the joint distributions of the subjective probabilities of leaving bequests
for those AHEAD respondents who were interviewed in the first and second waves of AHEAD.
The distribution of responses in wave 1, which is shown in the right-most column, has large
percentages at zero and at 1.0. Between waves 1 and 2, thedistribution shifted slightly toward
lower probabilities of bequests: for example 43.5% in wave 1 reported a probability of 1.0 but in
wave 2 just 39.1% reported a probability of 1.0. The percentage at 0.5 or lessshifted from 44.3
to 46.6. These are not large changes but they are consistent with a life-cycle model in which
individuals anticipate dissaving and when there are no population-wide shocks that affect all or
most expectations or that cause unexpected wealth change.
Even so, there are examples of large changes. About 4% reported probabilities of 0.0 in
wave 1 and 1.0 in wave 2 for the target of $10,000, implying a transition probabilityfrom zero to
one of 13%. The probability of reporting 0.0 in wave 2 conditional on a reportof 1.0 in wave 1
was about 10%. Such changes could, of course, be the result of large unexpectedwealth changes
or of measurement error. We will investigate later in this paper the correlatesof these changes.
When the target is $100,000 we find a modest reduction in the bequest probabilities
between the waves. For example the percentage reporting a probability of 1.0 declined from 18.5
to 16.2. Compared with the distribution for a target of $10,000, there is a much greater
percentage that report a probability of 0.0 reflecting the largedifference between the target and
the wealth of many households.
Table 7 has similar results for HRS waves 2 and 3. Compared with AHEAD a noticeable
difference is that the FIRS distribution shifts toward higher subjective bequest probabilities
between the waves. For example, in wave 1 44.9% were certain to leave a bequest at the $10,000
target but in wave 2 48.0% were certain. At the $100,000 target these percentages changedfrom
18.5 to 22.0. There are several reasons for the differences between AHEAD and HRS. The two-
year mortality rate for AHEAD was about 0.11,whereas it was just 0.02 in HRS. Therefore, the
increase in the chances of dying at advanced old age, and, therefore, dying with less wealth were
much greater in the AHEAD population than in the HRS population. Also, many in the FIRS
cohort are still working, and in the robust economic times between waves 2 and 3 (approximately
1994 to 1996) many likely had greater earnings than expected. Furthermore the stock and bond
markets had large capital gains, and the HRS cohort is more heavily invested in such assets than
the AHEAD cohort.
Determinants of change in bequest probabilities
We will study the determinants of changes in the subjective bequest probabilities by
relating them to new information, specifically, changes in the subjective survival probabilities,
out-of-pocket medical expenditures, the onset of a new health condition, changes in household
income, changes in wealth, widowing and retirement. Each of these may reflect new information
and therefore cause a change in the subjective bequest probabilities. We will present results from
13several types of estimation and discuss them together in that all the results pertain to the same
underlying process.
Because Tables 6 and 7 show substantial fractions of respondents to be at the extreme of
0.0, we will study the probability of reporting a positive probability in wave2 conditional on
reporting a probability of zero in wave 1. That is, we will estimate 3in the probit function
P(p2 > Op1= 0)=f(X/3)
wherefis the normal distribution function, P2isthe probability in wave 2 of a bequest at least as
large as the target, and Pi is the probability in wave 1. This probit isestimated over the 1222
observations in AHEAD wave 1 that reported Pi =0when the target was $10,000. Similar
probits are estimated for the Al-lEAD target of $100,000 and for both targetsin }{RS. Table 8
lists these estimated probit coefficients.
Because Tables6 and 7 also show considerable bunching of responses at 1.0, we
estimated probit functions for the probability of reducing bequest chances from 1.0 to chances
less than 1.0. That is we estimated l in
P(p2 <lp1 =1)=f(X/3)
overthe 1939 observations in AHEAD wave 1 that reported bequest chances of 1.0 for the target
of $10,000. Similar probit coefficients were estimated for a target of $100,000, and among HRS
respondents for both targets. The results are presented in Table 9.
Our final type of estimation is regression where the left-hand variable is the change in the
subjective bequest probabilities and the right-hand variables are measuresof new information.
Because the left-hand variable is limited to the range of -100 to 100, both OLS estimates and
Tobit estimates are presented. Table 10 has the result for AHEAD and Table 11 for HRS.
There are several consistent patterns revealed in these tables. First, it is rather remarkable
that the overall pattern of coefficients in Table 9 is the same as in Table 8 but with reversed
signs. For example, in Table 8 an increase in the subjective survival probabilityis associated
with an increase in bequest chances; in Table 9 it is associated with a decrease in the probability
of reducing bequest chances, or an increase in the chances of bequests. Because the estimations
are based on different sample the estimates are independent. Second,this positive relationship
between survival chances and bequest chances is found both for the two target levels in AHEAD
and HRS and for the several types of estimation. In Tables 8-11 most of the coefficients on the
change in the own subjective probability of survival are statistically significant.
To judge the magnitude of the effect of own survivor probability, consider the estimates
in Table 8 for the probability of moving from a zero response in wave one to a positive in wave
2, and consider an increase in survival chances from 0 to 100. Such a changewould increase the
probit index by 0.2. Evaluated at the average probability of a transitionfrom 0 to positive
(0.296), the predicted change is about 0.06. That is, an increase in the subjectivesurvival
probability would increase the probability of reporting positive chancesof a bequest from about
0.30 to 0.36. The effect at the target of $100,000 is somewhat larger, increasing the probability
of reporting positive bequest chances from 0.15 to 0.22. The changes in probabilities for HRS
would be approximately the same. These results are in accord with the effect of the subjective
survival probability on bequest probabilities among decedents as shown in Table 15. In that
table those with higher subjective survival chances anticipated a smaller reduction in wealth
before death.
14As explained above, without any behavioral responses an increase in survival chances
makes a large accidental bequest early in life less likely. But individuals may react to their
improved survival chances by reducing their current consumption so as to finance consumption
over a longer lifetime, and the resulting larger wealth holdings would make bequests more likely.
Our estimates indicate that the behavioral reactions dominate and that changes in bequests and
survival probabilities are positively related
Because the unit of observation is the individual, each spouse provides an observation on
his or her subjective bequest probability and on his or her subjective survival probability. The
estimates show that, especially in AHEAD, the effects of changes in the spouse's subjective
probability of survival are small and often have no consistent pattern. This is to be expected.
For example, a wife can give information about her own survival probabilities and how they
affect her own bequest probabilities, but yet not be aware of her husband's assessment of his own
survival probabilities. Thus, were he to lower his subjective survival probabilities the wife might
not alter her bequest probabilities even though the subjective survivorship of the household was
lower. The estimates suggest this scenario.
There are two other health related measures in these models: out-of-pocket medical
expenses and the onset of new health conditions in thehousehold. Out-of-pocket medical
expenses had little effect on the transitions from 0.0 or from 1.0 (Tables8 and 9), but they
reduced the average change in bequest probabilities (Tables 10 and 11). For example, in
AHEAD out-of-pocket expenditures of $10,000 are estimated to reduce the probability of a
bequest at the $10,000 target by about 1.5 percentage points. Of course, a considerable amount
of the variation in health costs are likely to be anticipated because of their ongoing nature. If that
were fully the case they would not be associated with any revision in bequest chances.
The onset of new health conditions has no consistent affect on revisions in bequest
probabilities, suggesting that survivor probabilities and out-of-pocket medical expenses may be
the two principal mechanisms through which unexpected health events alter expected bequests.7
The effect of widowing is likely to increase bequest chances in AHEAD. The death of a
spouse reduces needs for consumption relative to wealth, sothat the death acts like an increase in
wealth. Such an increase will increase bequests. At the same time, however, the death reduces
life expectancy of the household. According to the theory this reduction has an ambiguous effect
on bequests, and according to our estimates it has a small effect. The sum of the two effects is
likely to be to increase bequests.
In the HRS these effects are dampened. Wealth is increased relative to needs, but the
surviving spouse has many years in which to consume the increase in wealth before mortality risk
becomes substantial. Said differently, the surviving spouse can consume most of the increase
rather than bequeathing it. Furthermore, in the HRS most men are still working, so widowing is
typically associated with an unanticipated loss of future earnings. The overall effect is likely to
be a reduction in bequests.
Although no coefficients are significant, the pattern in AHEAD is consistent with this
71n HRS, new onsets are separated into severe and mild new onsets. Previous research has
shown that there is not yet enough data to make this distinction in AHEAD so that all new onsets
are combined in that data. See Smith (1999b) for a discussion of these issues.
15reasoning: widowing is associated with an increase in bequestprobabilities.8 In the HRS,
however, this reasoning is not supported. The only consistent patternof significant coefficients
is in Table 11, which shows that widowing is also associated with anincrease in the bequest
probabilities. Apparently the reduction in need for consumptiondominates the loss of human
capital.
In the AHEAD population, changes in household income have littleeffect on either the
transition probabilities or on the change in bequest probabilities. This is not surprisingin view of
the predictability of most AHEAD income sources such as pension andSocial Security income.
A change in household income has an impact in the HRS sample at the $100,000 bequest target,
possibly a reflection that some income changes were unexpected,due, for example, to better-
than-anticipated salary increases.
Increases in household wealth are consistently associated with increasesin the probability
of bequests. This positive relationship is found both in the probits and inthe expected changes in
bequest probabilities. Yet, the magnitude of this effect is not large.For example, an increase of
$100,000 should increase substantially the chances of leaving a bequestof $10,000; yet the
predicted effect in AHEAD would be an increase from 0.30 to0.35. The effects on the other
targets are even smaller. Of course, some of theobserved wealth change in the panel may have
been anticipated, which would explain the smaller effect.
As we have already discussed, only unanticipated wealth change should change
anticipated bequests; yet in general we have no method for separating unanticipatedfrom
anticipated wealth change. However, HRS has a series of questionsabout new purchases and
sales of stocks. We will say that the difference between the total change inthe value of stock
holdings and net new investments in stocks is unanticipated capital gains(Smith, 1999c). Total
anticipated financial wealth change will then be total financialwealth change less unanticipated
capital gains.
Table 12 summarizes the results of using these variables in estimation over theHRS
sample.9 Compared with previous tables and with the effects associatedwith anticipated wealth
change, unanticipated capital gains have their greatest effect onthe probit for the $100,000
target: those with large gains have a high likelihoodof continuing to state that their bequest
probability is 1.0. Compared with the target of $10,000, thedifferential effect is probably due to
large capital gains being concentrated among the relativelywell-to-do who are certain to give a
bequest of $10,000 regardless of capital gains.
In summary, in this section, we have shown that at the individual level, subjective
probabilities of bequests change with changes in covariates in a mannerthat is consistent with
the predictions about actual bequests based on our model of consumptionand saving. These
results are consistent with the view that the subjective bequest probabilities arevalid predictors
of actual bequest probabilities.
8That is, the wave to wave subjective bequest probability of the surviving spouse
increases.
9The regressions include the other covanates listed in Table 11.
16Section 6. Subjective bequest probabilities as an index of saving intentions.
Equation (4) in section 5 gives a relationship between the subjective bequest probabilities
at wave 1, actual bequests by decedents between the waves and subjective bequest probabilities
by the survivors in wave 2. But it can also be used to show how the subjective bequest
probabilities contain information about what the cohort anticipates bequeathing, and, when
combined with actual wealth holdings, what the cohort anticipates saving or dissaving.
Suppose that in equation (4) trefersto the present time period and t+1 to the greatest age
possible. Everyone dies shortly after t,andthe set d would be the entire baseline population and
the set swouldbe empty. Then in (4) the second term on the right-hand side would be zero and
the first term would be the fraction of the population that had actual bequests greater than b.
Therefore, the average of the subjective bequest probabilities predicts the fraction of actual
bequests greater than b. Equivalently the average of the subjective bequest probabilities gives a
point on the distribution of the bequests the cohort will actually make. We can compare this
point with an appropriate point from the distribution of actual wealth holdings to learn about
anticipated or intended saving or dissaving by the cohort. This result will be used to find
whether the AHEAD population anticipates dissaving before death by comparing points on the
distribution of wealth with subjective bequest probabilities.
There are a number of important reasons for wanting to establish whether the elderly
dissaving. If they do dissave, their control of economic resources will decline with age and,
should they survive to advanced old age, they may be poor. Dissaving implies that they will
bequeath less than their current wealth to the next generation. In that the elderly own substantial
amounts of assets, dissaving by them will reduce the national household saving rate. Finally,
anticipations of saving would be strong evidence for a bequest motive: a major implication of
the pure life-cycle model (no bequest motive) is that wealth should decline with age among those
of sufficient age.
Estimation of anticipated or desired saving behavior based on the subjective bequest
probabilities has advantages over tests based on actual wealth change in panels that span just a
few years. Unanticipated capital gains at the macro level can cause observed wealth change to
differ from anticipated wealth change over most households in a sample. The subjective
probabilities of bequests take into account rates of return over long time periods, so that average
rates of return would be closer to normal.
Table 13 shows for the AHEAD baseline sample the fraction of persons with wave 1
wealth at least as large as the target and the average of the subjective bequest probabilities. For
example, in wave 1, 84.9% had wealth at least as large as $10,000,yeton average just 57.4% of
households will die with bequests that large. That is, $10,000isapproximately the 15th
percentile point in the distribution of wave 1 wealth but, under the assumption that the
expectations about bequests are realized, it will be the 43th percentile in the distribution of
bequests. Similarly, $100,000 is approximately the 47th percentile in the wave 1 wealth
distribution but the 72th percentile of the bequest distribution. The implication is that the
AHEAD population anticipates substantial dissaving before death.
These results are consistent with the average change in the subjective bequest
probabilities among survivors as reported in Table 5. The average bequest probability at the
$10,000 target declined by 1.97 percentage points with standard error of 0.58. At the $100,000
17target theprobabilitydeclined by 0.90 percentage points with standard error of 0.49 (p-value of
0.06). Declining subjective bequest probabilities are consistent with intended dissaving.
The decedents differed at baseline somewhat from the full sample, but they also planned
to dissave before dying. Table 14 shows the percent of decedents that had wave 1 wealth at least
as large as the target amounts, the percent with actual estates at least as large as the target
amounts, and their average subjective bequest probabilities.W Their wealth was smaller than the
average of the entire sample both because of their greater age and also because of differential
mortality: the less well-to-do die sooner than the wealthy. At the $10,000 target the average of
their subjective bequest probability was 47.8, which implies that had the decedents lived and
consumed as they had anticipated when they responded in wave 1 about 48% of the would have
died with estates at least as large as $10,000. Yet about 75% had wave 1 wealth at least as large
as $10,000, and 74% had actual estates that reached $10,000. The implication is that the group
planned or anticipated that they would decumulate wealth before dying. Because they died
unexpectedly early, they were not able to decumulate.
As discussed in Section 2, the life cycle model makes no prediction about the response of
bequests to a change in mortality risk: if there were no behavioral response to an increase in risk,
bequests would increase because, under the assumption of wealth decumulation, people would
die earlier when their wealth was higher. If there were a strong behavioral response,
consumption could initially increase so much that actual bequests would fall due to lower wealth
holdings. The net effect could either be an increase or a decrease in bequests, so the actual effect
must be found from data. Similar reasoning shows that variation across individuals in their
perceived mortality risk does not produce a definite predication about the variation in bequests.
Table 15 shows the percentage of individuals whose wave 1 wealth reached the target
amounts and their average subjective bequest probability classified by the subjective survival
probability in wave 1 ."Amongrespondents who reported a subjective survival probability of
0% to 10% in wave 1,75% had wealth that reached $10,000. Their average subjective bequest
probability was about 49 %, and the difference was about 26%. Among those with subjective
survival probabilities of 90 to 100 wave 1 wealth was slightly lower, the average subjective
bequest probability was about the same, and the difference between them was about 24%. The
difference is about the same for the $100,000 target.
These results show that greater subjective survival probabilities have a small put positive
effects on anticipated bequests. The results arc in accord with the effect of a change in the
subjective survival probability on bequest probabilities as shown in Tables 6-9. In those tables
individuals who assessed that their survival chances had increased between the waves increased
their probabilities of bequests.
In Table 15, those with high subjective survival chances anticipated that their bequests
I&The number of observations in the table differs from the number of decedents because
of missing data on the subjective survival probabilities.
"Because we have individual-level observations on the subjective bequest probabilities
we compare wealth of the household in which the individual lives to bequest probabilities. Thus,
both the husband and the wife appear as separate entries in Table 13.
18would be somewhat larger than the bequests of those with low survival chances even though the
wealth of the two groups was about the same. An implication is that first group anticipated less
dissaving than the second in order to reach their expected bequests despite their greater expected
lifetimes. This implies a rather large behavioral response to mortality risk which is in accord
with estimates based on actual rates of dissaving in panel (Hurd, 1993): were the behavioral
response minimal the group with the higher survival rates would anticipate lower bequests.
Section 7. Conclusions
We have presented results about the magnitude and distribution of bequests based on new
methods of measuring actual and anticipated bequests. Actual bequests were measured in exit
interviews given by proxy respondents for 774 AHEAD respondents who died between waves 1
and 2 of the AHEAD survey. Among other things, these exit interviews provide data about the
medical and non-medical costs associated with the illnesses of the decreased respondents and the
value and distribution of their estates. Even though the deceased were quite ill before they died,
medical expenses did not cause a substantial reduction in their estates. Because the exit
interview obtained information about estates that is representative of the population the
distribution of these estate values are quite different than what one would suppose from estate
records, which are obtained only for a Wealthy subset of the population.
Anticipated bequests were measured in two waves of HRSandAHEAD by the subjective
probability of leaving bequests. We studied the reasons for between-wave revisions of the
subjective bequest probabilities. We found that increases in the subjective probability of
surviving, increments in household wealth, and widowing were all associated with increases in
bequest probabilities while out-of-pocket medical expenses reduced the likelihood of a bequest.
By comparing bequest probabilities with baseline wealth we were able to test a main prediction
of the life-cycle model, that individuals will dissave at advanced old-age. The Al-lEAD






Percentile Single Married All
5 0.0 0.0 0.0
10 0.0 0.0 0.0
20 0.0 2.0 0.0
30 2.0 20.0 10.0
40 20.0 35.0 30.8
50 33.3 50.0 50.0
60 50.0 100.0 54.4
70 77.0 150.0 100.0
80 125.1 150.0 150.0
90 180.0 200.0 188.5
95 250.0 400.0 322.7
98 600.0 600.0 600.0
Table 2






Wave 1 wealth excluding housing 42.4 104.8 72.1
Value of estate at death 80.6 109.8 94.5
Total out-of-pocket costs 9.3 9.4 9.4
Medical 3.7 4.6 4.2
Death expenses 4.4 4.1 4.3
Other 1.2 0.6 0.9Table 3
Determinants of estate
Probability of a positiveLogarithm of estate
estate among positive estates
Education
Less than high school










Household income (log, thousands) 0.220 0.596
(2.23) (4.23)
Surviving spouse 0.23 1 -0.93 1
(0.92) (2.47)
Death expenses (thousands) 0.012 0.009
(1.93) (0.11)
Number of living children -0.050 -0.063
(1.52) (1.13)
Number of grandchildren -0.003 0.008
(0.24) (0.30)
Number of great grandchildren 0.006 -0.018
(0.42) (0.60)
Number of living siblings 0.041 -0.022
(1.38) (0.57)
Parents dead 0.245 0.311
(1.53) (1.19)




Number of observations 594 451
Notes: Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. Probability coefficientsare from probit
estimation.A
Table 4




AHEAD HRS AHEAD HRS
10 90 92 75 78
9 83 87 56 66
8 77 85 44 57
7 71 81 34 49
6 65 78 18 41
5 56 72 10 30
4 40 67 7 22
3 30 56 5 14
2 13 46 2 11
1 4 25 1 7
Source:Smith(1999c)Table 5





Average subjective probability, survivors to wave 2 58.30 28.87
Average subjective probability, decedents before wave 2 47.83 19.60
Overall average 57.38 28.05
Wave 2
Average subjective probability, survivors to wave 2 56.33 27.97
Percent of estates with wealth ￿target, decedents before wave 2 73.68 36.00
Weighted average 57.82 28.68
Difference, wave 1 -wave2 -0.44 -0.63
Standard error 0.56 0.48
Number of observations 5204 5073
*Weightsare survival rate (0.9 12) and mortality rate (0.088).Table 6








0.5 1-0.99 1.00 All
0.00 21.6 2.0 1.7 1.3 4.1 30.7
0.01-0.49 2.0 1.3 0.8 0.9 1.0 6.0
0.50 1.7 1.1 1.5 1.1 2.3 7.6
0.51-0.99 1.2 0.9 1.9 3.9 4.2 12.2
1.00 4.4 1.3 3.2 7.1 27.5 43.5
All 30.9 6.6 9.1 14.3 39.1 100.0
N =4748
Probability bequest￿ $100,000wave 2 Probability bequest￿
$100,000 wave 1 0.000.01-0.490.500.51-0.99 1.00 All
0.00 52.1 3.3 2.2 1.6 2.3 61.4
0.01-0.49 2.4 1.5 0.9 0.8 0.4 6.0
0.50 2.0 0.8 1.4 1.3 1.2 6.7
0.51-0.99 1.1 0.9 1.1 2.4 1.9 7.4
1.00 2.9 1.0 1.6 2.5 10.5 18.5
All 60.6 7.5 7.2 8.5 16.2 100.1
N =4623Table 7
Distributionof bequest probabilities (percent): HRS waves 2 and 3.
Probability bequest￿ Probability bequest￿ $10,000wave 3
$10,000 wave2 0.000.01-0.490.500.51-0.991.00 All
0.00 10.9 1.6 1.4 1.1 3.2 18.1
0.01-0.49 2.1 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.4 7.3
0.50 1.3 1.0 2.1 2.3 3.2 9.9
0.51-0.99 1.0 1.2 2.0 7.5 7.9 19.7
1.00 2.5 1.1 2.5 6.5 32.3 44.9
All 17.8 6.3 9.2 18.6 48.0 100.0
N =9084
Probability bequest￿ Probability bequest￿ $100,000wave 3
$100,000 wave 2 0.000.01-0.490.500.51-0.99 1.00 All
0.00 35.4 3.5 2.1 1.6 2.6 45.2
0.01-0.49 5.3 4.0 2.0 2.1 1.4 14.7
o.so 1.6 1.5 1.9 2.1 2.0 9.1
0.51-0.99 1.4 1.2 1.6 4.2 4.1 12.5
1.00 1.7 0.9 1.5 2.6 11.9 18.5
All 45.4 11.0 9.0 12.6 22.0 100.2
N =8964Table
Probits for positive probability of a bequest
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Change in subjective survival probability
Change in subjective survival probability
of spouse
Out-of-pocket medical costs ($100)
New health condition
New health condition, minor
New health condition, major
Change in household income ($10,000)





































Note: Entries are estimated effects (probit coefficients) on the probability that a bequest will be
positive given that the prior wave probability was zero. Absolute t-statisticin parentheses.
Includes controls for race, sex, ethnicity, education, region of residence, and birth cohort.Table 9
Probits that the probability of a bequest is less than 1.0 given prior wave probability of 1.0
AHEAD HRS
Change in subjective survival probability
Change in subjective survival probability
of spouse
Out-of-pocket medical costs ($100)
New health condition
New health condition, minor
New health condition, major
Change in household income ($10,000)















































































0.360 Average conditional probability 0.368 0.432
Note: Entries are estimated effects (probit coefficients) onthe probability that a bequest will be
less than 1.0 given that the prior wave probability was 1.0.Absolute t-statistic in parentheses.
Includes controls for race, sex, ethnicity, education, regionof residence, and birth cohort.Table 10




Changein subjective survival probability 0.085 0.065 0.090 0.097
(4.48) (3.97) (4.34) (4.01)
Change in subjective survival probability 0.020 -0.05 1 0.02 1 -0.024
of spouse (0.66) (1.97) (0.66) (0.69)
Out-of-pocket medical costs ($1,000) -0.145 -0.105 -0.155 -0.083
(1.98) (1.67) (1.95) (0.94)
New health condition -0.246 -0.472 -0.287 -1.038
(0.18) (0.39) (0.19) (0.62)
Change in household income ($10,000) 0.003 0.006 -0.028 0.018
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.21)
Change in household wealth ($10,000) 0.038 0.030 0.040 0.023
(2.25) (2.05) (2.32) (1.33)
Widowed 1.730 0.370 4.810 1.610
(0.55) (0.37) (1.42) (0.42)
N 4211 4119 4211 4119
Note: Entries are estimated effectson the change in the probability that a bequest will be at least
aslarge as the target amount. Absolute t-statistic in parentheses. Subjective survival probability
scaled0-100. Includes controls for race, sex, ethnicity, education, region of residence, and birth
cohort.Table 11




Change in subjective survival probability 0.085 0.065 0.088 0.067
(5.95) (4.72) (5.83) (4.71)
Change in subjective survival probability 0.024 0.037 0.027 0.039
of spouse (1.16) (1.82) (1.22) (1.84)
Out-of-pocket medical costs ($1,000) -0.107 -0.105 -0.109 -0.107
(2.00) (2.01) (1.93) (2.02)
New health condition, minor -1.292 0.760 -1.308 0.763
(1.23) (0.75) (1.19) (0.73)
New health condition, major 0.797 -0.998 0.938 -1.114
(0.61) (0.79) (0.62) (0.85)
Change in household income ($10,000) 0.047 0.142 0.052 0.150
(0.97) (3.04) (1.02) (3.10)
Change in household wealth ($10,000) 0.021 0.041 0.021 0.041
(1.72) (3.38) (1.68) (3.35)
Widowed 11.980 8.710 12.500 9.230
(3.50) (2.64) (3.46) (2.69)
Retired -2.990 -0.148 -3.090 -0.177
(1.95) (0.10) (1.92) (0.11)
N 7735 7645 7735 7645
Note: Entries are estimated effects on the change in the probability that a bequest will be at least
as large as the target amount. Absolute t-statistic in parentheses. Subjective survival probability
scaled 0-100. Includes controls for race, sex, ethnicity, education, region of residence, and birth
cohort.Note: Capital gains
Table 12
Change in the probability of a bequest: HRS





Wave I wealth 84.9
Average subjective bequest probability 57.4
Number of observations 5204 5073
Target amounts
Financial capital gains
Other financial wealth change
$10,000 $100,000 $10,000
Tobit estimates:expected Probitestimates













Percent of decedents with wealth or estates at least as large as target amounts and average
subjective bequest probability: AHEAD
Target amount
$10,000 $100,000
Wave 1 wealth 75.0 38.0
Actual estates 73.7 36.0
Average subjective probability 47.8 19.6
Number of observations 456 450
Table 15
Percent of decedents with wealth or estates at least as large as target amounts and average
subjective bequest probability: AHEAD
N =371
Target amount
$10 thousand $100 thousand
Subjective survival probability
0-10 90-100 0-10 90-100
Wave 1 wealth 75.2 73.3 37.6 43.3
Average subjective probability 49.4 49.6 19.8 26.7
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